INTRODUCTION
The idea that each young adult is entitled to an equal capital endowment funded mainly from inheritance taxation is an important part of current liberal-egalitarian debate. For instance, Ackerman & Alstott (1999) have advocated the principle of 'stakeholding', through which each U.S. citizen has the right to a share in the wealth accumulated by preceding generations.
Similarly, Nissan & Le Grand (2000) have recently proposed that each 18-year-old in Britain should receive a capital grant from the state, funded from reformed inheritance taxes.
1 In this paper, we trace some of the less familiar intellectual antecedents of these contemporary proposals. Our motivation for writing the paper is, however, not exclusively historical; as Terence Ball has put it, unless we suffer from "present-minded conceits", all of us might learn something useful by considering debates from different historical contexts.
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The three specific cases we examine come from American writers of the first half of the nineteenth century. The first and least developed case was presented by Cornelius Blatchly in 1817; the second, and more comprehensive case was presented by Thomas Skidmore in 1829; and the third and perhaps most intriguing case was presented by Orestes Brownson in 1840. Each of these writers argued that equal opportunities required equal starts. In their view, the existing inheritance regimes perpetuated and accentuated a strongly unequal division of individual wealth, which therefore violated equal starts and jeopardised equal opportunities. Accordingly, they called for a drastic reform or even abolition of private inheritance, suggesting alternative mechanisms to disperse the value of the property of the deceased so as to secure equal starts and thus to promote 1 White (2001: 11, footnote 15) indicates the range of current proposals. 2 Ball (2000: 62-3) .
genuine equal opportunity.
Although there is no easily identifiable transmission of intellectual influence between the three writers, we begin by considering a common and possibly shared background to them, provided especially by the views of Jefferson and Paine. Both of these more illustrious theorists argued that that each individual had an equal birthright in land, or at least its equivalent, which should take priority over any inherited property arrangements. We then turn to Blatchly and his endorsement of that argument together with his justification of an equal division of inherited property among all maturing individuals in each generation. Next we deal with the much more radical proposal by Skidmore for both achieving and maintaining equal division of property among all adults. After that we turn to Orestes Brownson, and his fascinating claim to have synthesised French
Saint-Simonianism and the American spirit of equal opportunity. In the final section, we highlight a few aspects of these early contributions, and briefly compare the past and present debates.
THE JEFFERSON-PAINE LEGACY
Like many of their contemporaries, Jefferson and Paine endorsed the conventional premise that all individuals had a birthright to property in land. This followed from the original grant of the earth as the common stock of the human race. Like some of their contemporaries, they argued that this entitlement might be recognized in certain settings by a compensatory equivalent for the dispossessed. Various writers suggested different equivalents, typically including education and employment, or exceptionally, even subsistence itself. 3 Paine alone argued that this equivalent should include the provision of a universal and equal capital endowment to all young adults. For all of these writers, the entitlement to an equal birthright took precedence over conventional practices of the individual transmission of property. Such practices could be justified, if at all, only on the familiar utilitarian ground that they were an incentive to the creation and conservation of property through time. In the context of the late eighteenth-century Anglo-American debate on intergenerational issues,
Jefferson as well as Paine therefore endorsed the radical position that "the inheritance of private property [was] rightfully just as subject to social regulation as the inheritance of political power".
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Even if Jefferson did not regard property itself as a natural right, he arguably did consider that access to uncultivated land, as a natural means of production, was such a right. 5 The earth had been given as "a common stock" to mankind "to labour & live on" 6 . Private appropriation was acceptable only insofar as it was dispersed with none being permanently excluded. In America, where there was not yet a landed monopoly, this preferred solution could be implemented by every possible means so that "as few as possible shall be without a little portion of land". 7 In Europe, with its concentrated private ownership of all land, this preferred solution could have been realised only by challenging the established landed monopoly. Jefferson conceded that the situation in those 'old' countries, which combined "uncultivated lands and unemployed poor", was such an extension of "the laws of property (…) as to violate natural right". 8 Despite that, he considered that this acknowledged violation should be remedied not by redistribution, but through the state taking action to secure 4 Lynd (1982: 70) . 5 Cf. Matthews (1984: 19-29) . 6 Jefferson to James Madison, October 28,1795 (Jefferson 1999: 107 employment. In the last resort, however, the unemployed might justifiably seize any remaining uncultivated land, even if others privately owned it. 9 Jefferson insisted that the preferred dispersal mechanisms should not be constrained by conventional succession arrangements between generations.
Each generation had an equal right to a free usufruct over the earth unconstrained by past property dispositions. 10 That right trumped established practices of the individual transmission of property. Those practices were based on mere legal fictions whereas the reality was that "The will and the power of man expire with his life, by nature's law."
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Insofar as individual transmission could be justified it was only as an "artificial continuance, for the encouragement of industry". 12 In the American setting, the availability of uncultivated public lands eased any tension between this efficiency concern with the magnitude of the pool of inherited resources and the issue of its equitable distribution. In the European setting, by contrast, Jefferson effectively endorsed Madison's arguments against redistribution. In the first place, Madison insisted that redistribution would be inequitable, because even if the earth was the gift of nature to the living, their title could extend only to its original unimproved value. In contrast, any improved value resulting from the labour of past owners was justifiably subject to private transmission.
Secondly, Madison objected that redistribution would be inefficient, because instability in property regimes would act as a disincentive to the creation and conservation of resources through time.
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Although Paine adopted a compensatory strategy at least in the European context, his ideas on the form of an inalienable 'birth-right' to natural 9 Ibid.: 107. 10 Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789 (Jefferson 1999: 593) . 11 Jefferson to J.W. Eppes, June 24, 1813 (Jefferson 1999: 599) . 12 Ibid.: 599. 13 James Madison to Jefferson, February 4,1790 (Jefferson 1999 .
property were markedly different to those of Jefferson and indeed other contemporaries. Like them, Paine insisted that this birthright took precedence over inherited property dispositions. Unlike them, he argued that it should include the provision of a universal and equal capital endowment, rather than education alone or in conjunction with employment.
These proposals received their philosophical defense in his Agrarian
Justice (1795-6). 14 This defense was based on two distinct principles. The first was that at least in situations where no uncultivated land remained available for individual appropriation, each proprietor of cultivated land owed "to the community a ground-rent" 15 whose proceeds should be disbursed equally to all dispossessed persons. So, a system of compensation between appropriators and non-appropriators, mediated by the state, reflected Paine's contention that "the earth, in its natural uncultivated state was, and ever would have continued to be, the common property of the human race". 16 As such, each person had a claim right to an (uncultivated) share equal to that of any other person. The second principle assimilated personal to landed property by maintaining that "it is as impossible for an individual to acquire personal property without the aid of society, as it is for him to make land originally". 17 Only returning a part of it could discharge the obligation of property owners to the society, which had made the accumulation possible.
In his financial calculations, Paine initially affirmed that the fund proposed in his welfare plan would be derived from ground-rent based on 14 Claeys (1998: 207) points out that little is known about the reception of Agrarian Justice. Significantly, perhaps, he indicates that segments of it were printed by exiled radicals in America, followed by full editions published in Albany and Philadelphia as early as 1797. 15 Paine(2000: 325 Bestor (1970: 97-8) . 25 Harris (1966: 12) . 26 Hinshaw (1936, Vol. III: 37) . 27 Wilentz (1984: 158-61 Bestor (1970: 99, 104 ); see also Lynd (1982: 86) . The episode is not mentioned in Harrison (1969) , the standard work on Owen. 31 Blatchly (1817: 195) . legitimate titles to property. Using the Bible as his ultimate source, he identified the first title as God's gift to man of dominion over the world. He hastened to add that 'man' had to be understood as "a term including all men and women", and that the title was given to him "not in his individual, but in his aggregate capacity". 32 God's creation, therefore, was meant "for general use and benefit, and not for individual aggrandizement and oppression of the multitude". 33 Rights to particular items of property could be obtained only on the basis of the second title, occupancy, or on that of the third, improvement, by which Blatchly referred to the "improvement, use, and multiplication of the productions of the earth, seas and air, by industry, art, and ingenuity". 34 Claims to income or goods which had no connection with the public good, occupancy or improvement, were deemed unjust.
The main message which Blatchly tried to convey with his essay was that interests, rents, duties, tithes, etc., all being unjust rights to property, had devastating effects for a large part of the population. After having mentioned "a few of the evils, afflictions, and deaths attributable to interests, duties, and unequal inheritances", he concluded pessimistically:
"The miseries are more than I am able to depicture". 35 For its denouncement of the oppression and exploitation of the labouring population, Blatchly's essay might rightly be considered as "the first significant contribution to modern socialist theory in the United States".
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For our purposes, however, the essay is interesting because it contains the germs of a proposal for an alternative property regime guaranteeing a basic capital to all. How can a man who is dead, be said to will? All his mental and corporal powers, have ceased as to this world. He has no property; he has no power; he can have no will; for he has no existence in this world; and consequently, he has in this world no property.
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But then, of course, the question arose to whom should be transferred the rights to the property of the deceased. Given the dual origin of property, Blatchly's initial response was that the property belongs to society:
To whom can it more naturally and rationally revert than to its most immediate source, to the society, the community, the nation whence this property was derived? It is the commonwealth's.
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Although the precise form of this community of property remained unclear, it turns out that Blatchly was thinking more along the lines of an individual right to an equal share than along the lines of common property. This is revealed in particular by his insistence that all young men and women had "a right to their averaged share, which is due from the society".
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According to Blatchly, a mechanism had to be devised in order to ensure 37 Blatchly (1817: 205 that the principle "to every man and woman an equal portion" held through time for each individual in every generation. 41 Blatchly's solution was remarkably simple: in every year the property of the deceased had to be divided equally among the men and women reaching adulthood. The property of the deceased should be distributed not by the absurd legal fiction of wills, all too often "unjust and oppressive", but in equal shares determined by natural rights: "Every child in a nation has perhaps a natural right to an equal proportion of all the property of every deceasing member of the national family (…)." 42 To illustrate the principle, Blatchly gave the following example:
Suppose we were a nation of seven millions of inhabitants, and that each person, (if the whole property in the union was equally divided,)
would be entitled to a dividend worth 3000 dollars; and suppose (of the men and women who are adult, and hold property,) one seventieth of the population, or 100,000, die annually, these would leave a property of three hundred millions of dollars and more. Gilbert (1834) ; Harris (1966: 92-6 ); Hugins (1960: 82-3 and passim) . 50 Pessen (1956) . 51 See Carlton (1907) and Sumner (1918) for a general overview. 52 See Harris (1966: 94) , Pessen (1963: 209) , and Carlton (1907: 404 Conkin (1980: 222-58) for an excellent account of American Agrarianism. Pessen (1967: 148-9) claims that is "reasonably certain" that Skidmore was influenced by the English Agrarians Thomas Spence, William Ogilvie and Thomas Paine. 54 Skidmore (1829: 30-77 given that the existing property rights in society were distributed extremely unequally, a mechanism had to be found to set the situation straight. The way to proceed was indicated by the book's long and significant subtitle, which aptly summarized Skidmore's ideas on property: Being a
Proposition to Make it Equal among the Adults of the Present Generation: and to Provide for its Equal Transmission to Every Individual of Each
Succeeding Generation, on Arriving at the Age of Maturity. The first part of his plan was to re-establish equality hic et nunc, in a draconian attempt to restore the original equality of property rights. After that, in order to prevent inequality from reappearing in the future, the rights of bequest and inheritance had to be drastically reduced. Hence the second part of his plan consisted of the abolition of the system of individual inheritance and its replacement by an equal share mechanism, strongly reminiscent of Blatchly.
The novelty of Skidmore's theoretical position lay in the proposition to equalise property in the present generation. This feature above all has led to the book being described as probably "the single most comprehensive statement of (…) pre-Marxian American radicalism". 57 In his brief and controversial role within the New York Working Men's Party, moreover, Skidmore turned this theory into "a political challenge" and "radical crusade". 58 From the start, however, people like Robert Dale Owen condemned it and expressed the opinion that it hampered the cause of the New York labourers. 59 Skidmore's demise and lack of success after quitting the party seem to suggest that his ideas were not widely supported, but this view has been challenged.
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57 Lynd (1982: 88) . 58 Conkin (1980: 225) . 59 Owen (1829; 1830) . 60 Pessen (1967: 147) . 2) Adoption of a new State Constitution, decreeing the abolition of all debts, and claiming all the property of its citizens.
3) Organization of a Census of the population. 61 Skidmore (1829: 137-44 In addition Skidmore gave detailed explanations on how to deal with property of foreigners, indivisible items, State property, etc. Without going into details, we note that the General Division was sufficiently complex to require a "universal suspension of all business, except in so much as is necessary for subsistence, until the whole can be accomplished".
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Although at first sight it seemed to be "a matter of great difficulty", Skidmore was confident that "on examination, it will be found to be of very easy execution".
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Leaving aside all of the issues raised by this specific procedure, the more interesting issue is why Skidmore considered it so important to establish an equal division of property within the present generation, instead of restricting it to future ones as suggested by his predecessors. Skidmore explicitly rejected that gradualist strategy on two grounds. The first of these was based on the familiar problem that inheritance limitations could and certainly would be evaded by inter vivos transfers:
For, as property which is not money, may yet be converted into money; so will it be; and if a man, with the present erroneous views of his right to property, is not permitted, in his lifetime, to make a will, which will be valid after death; he may yet, although against the law of the land, and no doubt, would, (I speak generally,) secretly and Once an equal division had been achieved, the remaining problem was to ensure its equal transmission to every individual in all succeeding generations. Skidmore's objections to individual wills combined familiar jurisprudential arguments about the distribution of the pool of inherited wealth with utilitarian concerns over its magnitude. The jurisprudential arguments against wills were threefold: that they contravened "the rights of the succeeding generation"; that they were merely a legal fiction; and that they prolonged a maldistribution of property originating in force and fraud. 71 The utilitarian claim that the existing convention of individual transmission was a crucial incentive to the conservation of property through time was also contested. Insofar as the claim was supposed to apply to the link between parents and their own children, Skidmore was especially dubious. If parents were so concerned to secure the future of their offspring, then why were transfers made typically causa mortis when those offspring were likely to be already mature? That concern would be expressed more usefully by transfers inter vivos when the offspring were young adults starting out on their own lives. 72 Skidmore's conclusion was that like himself most people wanted property for their own sake rather than with the intention of bestowing benefit to specific future individuals.
Of course, future generations might benefit from this property, but that was an unintended consequence. He therefore rejected the suspicion that the combination of an initially equal division with a prohibition on gifts inter vivos and causa mortis would induce idleness and reduce the size of the pool of inherited wealth.
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of education for youngsters, but emphasised that this alone did nothing for the welfare of the adults themselves (Pessen, 1967: 184 (Doudna, 1978: v) ; see also Lasch (1991: 184-94) . 75 Both articles were reprinted that same year; we will quote from the 1978 Doudna edition of these reprints. 76 Lasch (1995: 64-6; 69-70) , Gilhooley (1972: 33-63 Brownson (1840a) . 81 Brownson (1857: 92) . 82 Brownson (1840a: 222) . 83 Ibid.: 223.
Saint-Simonians that hereditary property should be abolished, yet he firmly rejected their idea of a centrally planned distribution of the means of production according to individual capacities. In the first article on the Laboring Classes, however, he mentioned only the first aspect. The abolition proposal was presented briefly at the very end, as a logical consequence of the destruction of all forms of privilege:
There are many of these. We cannot specify them all; we will select only one, the greatest of them all, the privilege which some have of being born rich while others are born poor. It will be seen at once that we allude to the hereditary descent of property, an anomaly in our American system, which must be removed, or the system will be destroyed. (...) as we have abolished hereditary monarchy and hereditary nobility, we must complete the work by abolishing hereditary property.
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At that stage, no further arguments in favour of the abolition proposal were developed by Brownson, apart from the statement that a man's "power over his property must cease with his life, and his property must then become the property of the state, to be disposed of by some equitable law for the use of the generation which takes its place".
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Although Brownson stressed that he launched the proposal "for its free and full discussion" 86 , and not "as a measure for the immediate action of the community" 87 , the Whigs eagerly seized the opportunity to present
Brownson's proposal as an example of the dangerous tendencies in the Democratic camp. 88 Despite these attacks and the pleas of some of his 84 Brownson (1840b: 24 Schlesinger (1966: 100-11). friends to reconsider his views on inheritance, he did not back off but instead published a long defence of his views in the second article on the Laboring Classes. A new argument underpinning the inheritance abolition proposal was the need to have labourers equipped with property:
The doctrine we have long labored to maintain is, that the work of this country is to emancipate labor, by raising up the laborer from a mere workman, without capital, to be a proprietor, and a workman on his own farm, or in his own shop.
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What was at stake, therefore, was not simply the eradication of a privilege, but the "complete emancipation of labor by raising up each individual laborer to be an independent worker". unless, what will amount to the same thing, a plan be devised and carried into operation, by which the portion inherited by each shall be absolutely equal.
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The solution advocated by Brownson in fact combined the abolition of inheritance with the provision of equal shares. He claimed that his 89 Brownson (1840c: 59) . It might be that he refers to his article "Equality" published in The Gospel Advocate of 5 September 1829 (7: 282-3), recently reprinted in Brownson (2000: 372-5) . 90 Brownson (1840c: 60 proposition was "virtually the same with Jefferson's", and in conformity with the views of "a very respectable string of authorities". Arguments (1) and (2) implied that the rights to the property left by the deceased could not be of the common property type, but had to be rights held in severalty. Argument (3) implied that every child had an equal claim to inheritance. Brownson concluded that the property left by the deceased had to be divided equally among all the new adults: "one man can rightfully appropriate to himself no more than, in an equal division of the whole among all the members of the new generation, would be his share." 97 This would be "his share of the general inheritance", "which serves him for an outfit, as a capital with which to commence operations". 98 Men as well as women would receive a share. At this point a slight ambiguity in Brownson's reasoning must be pointed out. He seems to suggest that the property of the deceased in a given period, say a year, must be divided equally among those that have arrived at the age of maturity in that same period. Perhaps out of fear that the individual portions might vary too much from year to year, he proposed to calculate each new adult's portion as his share in the total capital of the nation:
In order to get at the proportion due to each, a general valuation as now of all the property of the commonwealth will need to be made.
The general valuation of all the property in the commonwealth once fixed, the simple rule of division will determine how much is the portion of the new occupant. Then a valuation of that vacated will determine how much of it must be allotted to one individual. 99 Brownson was well aware that his solution diverged from the SaintSimonian one, in the sense that he replaced the Saint-Simonian division of the means of production according to capacities by a strictly equal one. This is clear from the following statement which echoes only half of their famous slogan: "All we ask is, that men should, so far as society is concerned, be dealt by as equals, and after that, in all that depends on themselves, be treated according to their works." 100
AN ASSESSMENT
It has been observed that the radical labour leaders of the Jacksonian period remind us more of the eighteenth than of the nineteenth century, since they "continued to speak the language of the generation of Jefferson, Paine, and 99 Harris (1966: 63) . 104 Owen (1829) . Ten of the eleven candidates on the ticket received over 6,000 votes; Blatchly received only 4,787 votes; see Sumner (1918: 240 Although acknowledging that his own scheme had been labeled agrarian, Brownson emphasised that this was inappropriate because it called for the equal division of inherited property alone. As such, it recognised that "the right to property is sacred, and the Legislature has no right to disturb it. The
Legislature has discretionary power only over that portion of property 105 According to Wilentz (1984: 199) Blatchly was perceived as a supporter of Owen rather than Skidmore. In view of Blatchly's adoption of a communitarian stance, it seems quite plausible that he distanced himself from Skidmore. 106 He was first mentioned as an agent in the issue of 7 November 1829; his name disappeared from the issue of 8 May 1830 onwards. See also Brownson (1857: 62-3) . 107 Brownson (1842: 487). which becomes vacant through default of ownership, whether by death or abandonment of the proprietor." 108 A comprehensive analysis of the three proposals would take us too far.
There is, however, one aspect which we would like to mention here, since it appears to have been somewhat underestimated by our three authors.
None of them seemed particularly preoccupied by the long-term sustainability of an annual sharing of bequests among maturing adults.
They did realise that random short-term fluctuations in mortality, bequests, etc. might cause unwanted variations in the amount of the annual share, a tendency which could, however, be neutralised by an appropriate averaging procedure.
109 They were apparently much less worried by the variability of the annual share due to long-term demographic and economic tendencies.
Obviously, the annual share remains constant only if the amount of bequests and the number of maturing adults change in the same proportion, which need not be the case. 110 An additional problem would arise if it were required that the annual share be equal to the 'fair share' of property, by which is meant the average amount of property per adult. The sustainability of the system is then by no means guaranteed, and depends upon both demographic and economic factors. It can be shown that the 'bequest rate', i.e. the ratio of bequests to wealth, has to be equal to or higher than the 'maturing adult rate', i.e. the ratio of maturing adults to the adult population. 111 Skidmore and Brownson knew very well that inter vivos gifts might curtail bequests and hence undermine the system, and therefore they 108 Ibid. 109 Skidmore (1829: 259-60) , Brownson (1840c: 77 Despite all of this, the underlying rationale for capital grants remains remarkably constant. Then as now the basic objective was to provide some degree of economic independence, not in the sense of creating a universal class of rentiers permanently living off their capital without any need to work, but rather in providing all citizens with the economic means to 112 Skidmore (1829: 267-8; 346-8) , Brownson (1840c: 81-82 ). Brownson thought it was possible to distinguish between genuine inter vivos gifts done for "charitable or benevolent purposes" and causa mortis gifts "made with a view to a man's death, and for the purpose of exercising indirectly a sort of dominion after his death". Only the last ones should be prohibited. 113 White (2001: 5-6) . 114 Skidmore (1829: 140-1). engage in self-directed work. That this was an artisanal ideal threatened by a modern economy was recognised by our earlier writers, all of whom struggled to reconcile that ideal with the emerging reality of an extensive labour market and a developed division of labour.
APPENDIX: The mathematics of equal division of bequests
We use a rudimentary formal explanation to examine whether the BlatchlySkidmore-Brownson system is sustainable.
We make the following assumptions: 1) the age of maturity is fixed from the beginning (e.g. 18 years); 2) only adults, i.e. those who have passed the age of maturity, can own property.
Let A(t) be the total adult population at time t (a stock variable), M(t) the number of maturing adults at time t, and D(t) the number of dying adults at time t (these are flow variables). Ignoring migration, it is easy to see that the change of the adult population at time t, i.e. ( ) & A t , is equal to M(t) -D(t). Moreover, let W(t) be the total amount of wealth at time t (a stock variable), and B(t) the amount of bequests at time t (a flow variable).
If the total amount of bequests is divided equally among all maturing adults, each maturing adult will receive a share b M (t):
It is evident that if the amount of bequests and the number of maturing adults change in different proportions, the share b M (t) will not be constant over time.
In the case of Brownson, and probably also in the case of Skidmore, the share of wealth received by each maturing adult should be equivalent to the 'fair share' of wealth of each adult. In their view, this fair share was equal to the average wealth per adult, i.e. the total amount of wealth divided by the total adult population. Let this fair share be w A (t):
Again, whenever the rate at which the total amount of wealth changes is different from the rate at which the total adult population changes, the fair share of wealth will not be constant over time.
The system will work if the share received by each maturing adult is higher than or equal to her fair share, i.e. if b M (t) ≥ w A (t). In view of (2) and (1) this means:
An equivalent formulation is:
This condition means that the bequest rate (B/W), i.e. the portion of wealth released in the form of bequests at time t, must be higher than or equal to the maturing adult rate (M/A), i.e. the portion of 'new' adults at time t. The bequest rate is a variable which describes economic behaviour, while the maturing adult rate is a demographic variable. The condition therefore states that economic behaviour must be in conformity with demographic tendencies. There is no guarantee that this is always the case.
To illustrate the issue, we will express the condition in a slightly different form. Let b D (t) be the average bequest at time t:
Since we have B(t) = b D (t).D(t) and W(t) = w A (t).A(t), the bequest rate can be written as: 
Hence, the 'average bequest/average wealth' ratio (b D /w A ) must be higher than or equal to the ratio of maturing to dying adults (M/D). In case of a growing adult population, the latter ratio is higher than 1. For the system to be sustainable, the average bequest must then exceed the average wealth in at least the same proportion. If, however, there are significant inter vivos gifts, or if other mechanisms exist that reduce bequests, it might very well be that the average bequest is substantially lower than the average wealth. The pool of funds raised by bequests will then be insufficient to give everyone his fair share of wealth.
Although Blatchly did not raise the issue of the relation between the two shares, it turns out that his numerical example satisfies the sustainability condition. He (implicitly) assumes population and wealth to be stationary. The adult population is equal to seven millions, of which each year one seventieth dies; the number of maturing adults is each year equal to one hundred thousand. The average wealth amounts to three thousand dollars, and the average bequest is (at least) equal to the average wealth. Schematically we have:
A(t) = 7,000,000 D(t) = 100,000/year M(t) = 100,000/year W(t) = $ 21,000,000,000 B(t) ≥ $ 300,000,000/year Hence we have:
b D (t) ≥ $ 3,000 w A (t) = $ 3,000
Since b D (t)/w A (t) ≥ 1 and M(t)/D(t) = 1, the sustainability condition (7) holds.
